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The Great War was a cataclysmic event that dismantled Empires, 
transformed the nature of warfare, 
and produced a final butcher’s bill of 
more than ten million dead and twice 
that many wounded and maimed. 
With the war raging for more than four 
years and involving, by its end, almost 
every country in the world, its legacy 
continues to be debated more than eighty years 
on. Two scholars, one an American professor of 
English, John Mosier, and the second, a British 
professor of War Studies, Gary Sheffield, have 
recently offered new and ambitious overviews of 
the Great War.
John Mosier’s The Myth of the Great War 
commences with an introductory passage on how 
the conflict has been misunderstood over the last 
eighty years. There is no doubt that the Great War 
has unleashed a great war of words over the last 
century, and not all of them useful, but one always 
grimaces when an author claims to reveal a “great 
deal that has been ignored or suppressed by other 
historians.” (Preface). Since Mosier offers some 
questionable statements in his notes on sources, 
it would seem, however, that he too has only a 
tenuous grasp on the historiography.
Mosier’s provocative series of theses are that the 
United States saved the Allied war effort after 
Britain and France had bungled their way through 
almost four years of fruitless campaigns; that the 
Germans were consistently victorious in battle; 
and that the Allies, in order to cover up their 
gross incompetence, willfully misrepresented 
their operational failures. Astonishing to this 
reviewer, others have described this book as 
thought-provoking. That may be a statement 
applied to revisionist histories such as 
this, but it is also a phrase that reviewers 
sometimes use when they are unsure 
about the validity of the conclusions 
and arguments. Those with a passing 
interest may indeed find Mosier’s book 
thought-provoking, but those who have 
studied the war in detail will only find 
it aggravating and inept history of the 
worst kind. There are problems with The Myth 
of the Great War at every turn: it is poorly 
structured, promises but fails to offer convincing 
conclusions, and contains countless errors of fact 
and interpretation. 
In this supposed general history of the war, 
there are bizarre gaps. For instance, there are 
two detailed chapters on France and Germany 
at the beginning of the book, but nothing on 
Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and only the 
briefest of references to Great Britain. Having 
chosen to ignore most of the major belligerents, 
the next chapter starts in August 1914. There is 
also no attempt to outline the complex factors 
that led to war, an area of scholarship that has 
been pregnant with detailed studies in the last 
two decades. This type of episodic narrative 
is prevalent throughout the book: Mosier has 
decided to tell only parts of the story. While it is 
fully acknowledged that all authors must limit 
the extent of their coverage, Mosier seems only 
to highlight those historical events that show the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) or the French 
Armies in the worst possible light. The historical 
narrative is episodic, unbalanced, and, for the 
most part, unfair.
One of Mosier’s key points of contention 
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is the untrustworthy 
c o n t e m p o r a r y 
documentary  and 
statistical evidence 
issued by the Allies. 
Having examined the 
propaganda of the 
time, Mosier observes 
that it, not surprising 
for nations engaged in 
death struggles, was 
untruthful. Indeed it 
was, but Mosier seems 
blissfully unaware that 
historians have written 
for decades about the 
flawed nature of the 
wartime propaganda discourse. To use an 
account from a British or French newspaper (or 
German for that matter, although Mosier never 
does), and to call it biased and obfuscating is 
not terribly revealing. Having set up straw-man 
arguments, Mosier knocks them down, and 
then claims an original interpretation of the war. 
Mosier is continually drawing conclusions that 
he suggests are new, which in fact have been in 
print for years. 
This weak historical approach is endemic 
throughout The Myth of the Great War, but 
few sections are so partisan as the assessment 
of the fighting efficiency of the national armies. 
Desperate to support his thesis on the superiority 
of German soldiers, Mosier ignores anything 
that might disprove his case. The question of the 
French and German bloodbath at Verdun in 1916 
is a strong case in point where Mosier presents 
the German operations as a tour de force. The 
nearly equal casualties by the end of the ten-
month battle, to say nothing of the unending 
horror of the fighting as depicted by countless 
frontline soldiers, both French and German, 
should have been enough to rattle Mosier’s 
assumptions. They do no such thing, and so 
his conclusions of the fighting and aftermath 
at Verdun are among the most ludicrous in the 
book, and perhaps in print (225). 
While the French are held up as incompetents 
slaughtered at the hands of the German elite 
army, so too are the British. At every turn, Mosier 
attempts to denigrate the BEF. Mosier writes, 
for example, that the March Offensive “virtually 
finished [the BEF] as an offensive force” (319). 
Mosier can posit such ludicrous statements 
since he misunderstands and downplays the 
string of British operational victories in the 
Last Hundred Days. As part of his argument 
that no British force had ever made “any 
real gains other than what was fabricated by 
propagandists,” Mosier might well cast his eyes 
to the Canadian Corps, which fought as part of 
the BEF, and their victories at Vimy Ridge (April 
1917), Hill 70 (August 1917) and Passchendaele 
(October-November 1917). But it was not just the 
Canadians who succeeded in battle and it is clear 
that many British units, and not just elite ones, 
were, by the last half year of the war, continually 
driving the Germans from their entrenched 
positions on the Western Front. Unfortunately, 
that would not fit into Mosier’s thesis of the inept 
Allied forces, and so it is conveniently left out. 
But even Mosier seems quite at a loss to explain 
how this German army of super-soldiers could 
have been defeated on the field of battle. Instead 
of rethinking his anti-British stance, he simply 
ignores the contradictory evidence that effectively 
undercuts his flawed thesis. 
Having unconvincingly denigrated the fighting 
efficiency of the Allied armies and presented 
mundane observations about the propaganda of 
the time, Mosier overplays his hand in arguing 
that the Americans won the war. There is no 
doubt that the Americans had a very important 
psychological impact on the German High 
Command after their troops began to cross 
the Atlantic in greater numbers towards the 
end of 1917, but their tactical impact on the 
battlefield was not nearly as important. Mosier 
offers no distinction, instead arguing that the 
Americans won the war through their battlefield 
exploits. However, Pershing certainly did not have 
command over “most 
of the Allied fighting 
strength” by July 1918, 
and there are few 
who still believe that 
Pershing was the leader 
of men that Mosier 
purports, elevating 
him to a position that 
was “unique among the 
senior commanders 
of the war” (306-7). 
There is no doubt that 
the Americans had a 
significant impact on 
the war, but Mosier 
offers no new evidence 
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to convince the reader that they won the war for 
the Allies. 
In the end, Mosier supports none of the claims 
that he promises in his introduction; instead, 
this is a rehashing of outdated, superseded 
concepts that fails to push the historiography 
in new directions. Moreover, as an overview 
summary it is so unbalanced and prejudicial in 
its assessments that readers must be alerted to 
its complete unreliability as a useful historical 
text. 
Gary Sheffield’s Forgotten Victory is a much 
stronger work and a valuable contribution in 
appraising and summarizing the new Great War 
scholarship. As a professor of War Studies at 
King College and a leading expert on land warfare 
in the twentieth century, Sheffield has absorbed 
the enormous outpouring of writing on the war, 
and has provided a convincing re-appraisal, 
primarily, on the role of the British Expeditionary 
Force. Sheffield bravely tackles long-standing 
beliefs and offers a re-evaluation of the BEF in 
battle; a discussion on the evolution of the war-
winning combined arms doctrine; a more positive 
presentation of Sir Douglas Haig; one of the best 
accounts in print of the all-important year of 
battle, 1918; and several insightful chapters on 
how the Great War has been remembered and 
conceptualized over the twentieth century. 
 The opening line: “The First World War 
was a tragic conflict, but it was neither futile 
or meaningless,” sets the tone for the book. 
As opposed to Mosier who presents the war 
in absolutes, Sheffield is well aware of the 
complexities and debates that have raged 
unceasingly for decades. Throughout this work, 
Sheffield sensibly lays out the historiography and 
weaves his way through the contested ground. 
There are no easy answers, and some of the 
most difficult questions have involved the fighting 
efficiency of the British armies. While Sheffield 
describes the terrible slaughter of trench warfare, 
he also explains why the British soldier continued 
to endure more than four years of deprivation 
and destruction. It was a war that the men of the 
British Armies had to fight, in conditions on the 
Western Front, for the most part, that were not 
of their choosing, as the Germans were almost 
always in the enviable position as defenders. 
There is no doubt that the British soldiers 
suffered in the steep learning curve of battle, but 
by 1918, once those lessons had been learned, 
they were the most efficient and effective fighting 
force on the Western Front.
 And what of Field Marshal Sir Douglas 
Haig, the principal braying ass leading the lion-
like British soldiers to their doom? That at 
least is how he has often been portrayed over 
the years. While Sheffield does not completely 
rehabilitate Haig, he tries to put him in the 
context of the war and the decision-making 
system of the British High Command. Haig 
may not have been a brilliant general, but a 
survey of all generals, be they French, Russian, 
German, or American, reveals that few if any 
could be classified as geniuses. Does that mean 
all the g enerals were donkeys? Perhaps a more 
sympathetic assessment is needed to account 
for the enormous technological and doctrinal 
challenges facing all armies. Haig’s strategy of 
attrition, which has been thoroughly condemned 
over the years, indeed seemed senseless and 
costly. It certainly resulted in terrible casualties. 
But modern wars fought by million-men armies 
of similar combat capability, and supported by 
the full resources of a nation, or several nations, 
will not result, with few exceptions, in a quick 
victory or low kill rates. 
 Forgotten Victory is a challenging work that 
drives the historiography in new directions, 
forcing the reader to confront and redress long-
standing beliefs about the Great War. Not all will 
agree with Sheffield’s analysis, and this reviewer 
is not persuaded, for instance, by his conclusion 
of the Somme battles as being a British success 
or at least less harmful to the British than the 
Germans. But, there are enough provocative 
and innovative ideas to make this book required 
reading for any serious student of the Great 
War. Moreover, Sheffield’s crisp writing style 
and masterful synthesis of complex arguments 
makes Forgotten Victory an ideal text for any 
undergraduate course. 
 In the Great War, it was the British rather than 
the Americans who made the greater contribution 
to victory, and indeed, in this case, they continue 
to do so in the Great War of Words.
Tim Cook is an historian at the Canadian 
War Musuem.
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